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Fundamentalism and science 
Massimo Pigliucci 
The many facets of fundamentalism. There has been much talk about fundamentalism of late. While 
most people's thought on the topic go to the 9/11 attacks against the United States, or to the ongoing war 
in Iraq, fundamentalism is affecting science and its relationship to society in a way that may have dire 
long-term consequences. Of course, religious fundamentalism has always had a history of antagonism 
with science, and – before the birth of modern science – with philosophy, the age-old vehicle of the 
human attempt to exercise critical thinking and rationality to solve problems and pursue knowledge. 
“Fundamentalism” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of the Social Sciences
1 as “A movement that 
asserts the primacy of religious values in social and political life and calls for a return to a 'fundamental' 
or  pure  form  of  religion.”  In  its  broadest  sense,  however,  fundamentalism  is  a  form  of  ideological 
intransigence which is not limited to religion, but includes political positions as well (for example, in the 
case of some extreme forms of “environmentalism”). 
In  the  United  States,  the  main  version  of  the  modern  conflict  between  science  and  religious 
fundamentalism is epitomized by the infamous Scopes trial that occurred in 1925 in Tennessee, when the 
teaching of evolution was challenged for the first time
2,3. That battle is still being fought, for example in 
Dover, Pennsylvania, where at the time of this writing a court of law is considering the legitimacy of 
teaching “intelligent design” (a form of creationism) in public schools. Yet, even in the US, creationism 
is certainly not the only battleground between fundamentalism and science, and in some respects, it isn't 
even the most crucial. The Bush administration, for example, has systematically overruled or ignored 
scientific  findings  in  areas  ranging  from  global  warming  to  drug  safety  in  order  to  affirm  their 
ideologically-determined set of priorities
4,5. Europeans have their own problems with dogmatic thinking 
too,  albeit  arising  from  a  different  historical  and  cultural  background.  Just  consider  the  sometimes 
irrational positions taken by green parties in Germany and England (e.g., indiscriminate, as opposed to 
reasoned, rejection of stem cell research, or of genetically engineered crops), or the fact that Italy has 
become the most restrictive European country on matters of stem cell research and in vitro fertilization, 
largely due to the still strong influence of the Catholic Church in Italian internal political affairs. 
In this essay, however, I will not focus on specific controversies, but rather on what I consider a largely 
unappreciated  dimension  of  the  problem.  It  seems  to  me  that  much  of  the  debates  surrounding  the 
science-society-religion cultural triangle are due to the failure of scientists and science educators – and 
hence of the media, elected officials and the public at large – to appreciate two crucial philosophical 
points. These concern the distinction between methodological and philosophical naturalism, and the 
distinction between “is” and “ought,” i.e., between matters of facts and value judgments. While I am 
certainly not as naïve as to suggest that simply explaining these two points to colleagues and the public 
will be enough to instantly “solve” the problems posed by the so-called “culture wars,” I am confident 
that this is a good place for discussion that should be pursued in search of a long-term reconciliation. I 
shall therefore explore these two philosophical issues within the context of fundamentalism (religious 
and not) and science, with the hope of helping to provide scientists and educators with two additional, 
formidable,  intellectual  and  educational  weapons.  I  should  also  warn  the  reader  that  the  following 
treatment glosses over several subtleties of the philosophical debate that are still occupying professional 
philosophers.  Nonetheless,  I  am  convinced  that  the  major  points  are  both  clear  enough  and  highly 
relevant, so as to deserve a much wider presentation that has been the case so far. 
Science and religion: methodological vs. philosophical naturalism. One of the basic fears of religious 
fundamentalists who challenge the teaching of evolution, be they “young-earth” creationists, “old-earth” 
creationists, or the slightly more sophisticated crowd of “intelligent design” supporters (see Scott 1997
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for  the  differences  among  these  and  other  versions  of  creationism),  springs  from  the  idea  that  the 
teaching of evolution starts a slippery slope that inevitably ends with atheism. Leaving aside the obvious 
point that atheism is in fact a legitimate philosophical position that – in a pluralistic society – ought to 
receive the same degree of respect as any other metaphysical school of thought, slippery slope arguments 
are  in  fact  logically  fallacious
7,  and  the  fallacy  lies  in  the  fact  that  most  people  (including,  alas, 
prominent science popularizers such as Richard Dawkins) don't make the subtle but crucial distinction 
between methodological and philosophical naturalism (Forrest 2000
8). 
Naturalism,  broadly  speaking,  is  the  idea  that  nature,  and  natural  phenomena,  is  all  there  is  –  as 
opposed to the supernatural realm and phenomena. As a philosophical position, this has a long history of 
elaboration and debate, and it obviously characterizes any individual who considers himself an atheist. 
Philosophical naturalism, then, is the (strong) metaphysical position that there is, as a matter of fact, no 
such thing as the supernatural. Methodological naturalism, however, is a (metaphysically) more modest 
claim, that essentially corresponds to the position that while there may be a supernatural realm, it does 
not enter, and need not be invoked, in any discussions of scientific findings. For the methodological 
naturalist, scientific explanations are naturalistic by definition, or else science would not have a set of 
reliable theoretical and empirical methods to proceed with. This is why the most embarrassing question 
one can ask a proponent of intelligent design is: if I give you a million dollars to set up a scientific 
research program, what sort of experiments would you pursue with the grant? There is no possible 
answer. 
The  crucial  point  here  is  that  a  scientist  is,  essentially  by  definition,  a  methodological  naturalist; 
however,  she  does  not  have  any  specific  commitment  (aside  from  her  own  metaphysical  views)  to 
philosophical  naturalism.  In  other  words,  science  does  not  necessarily  entail  atheism,  which  is  the 
fundamentalist's fear. How can we explain this to the general public? One way to go about it is to point 
out that most people are in fact methodological naturalists when it comes to everyday life. Suppose your 
car doesn't start today: how do you react to such an annoying occurrence? Most likely you will not 
invoke supernatural explanations, and will not attempt to have the car exorcised. Rather, regardless of 
your religious convictions, you will bring it to a mechanic, assuming (methodologically) that there must 
be something physically wrong with it. Moreover, even if the mechanic will not find the answer, and will 
not be able to fix your car, you will still persist in the (reasonable) belief that there must have been 
something physically out of place, with no supernatural implications or intervention required. You will 
shrug your shoulders, grudgingly pay the bill to the mechanic, and go in search of a new car or another 
mechanic. That is exactly what scientists do, and are required to do by their profession - no more, no 
less. 
There is, therefore, a good reason why many scientists are themselves religious
9, and it is a mistake 
(both  in  terms  of  public  relations  and  from  a  philosophical  standpoint)  to  present  the  scientific 
worldview as if it necessarily leads to atheism. Science can neither afford, nor does it need, a head-on 
confrontation with religion. The confrontation does need to occur, however, wherever religious ideology 
makes (unsupported, a priori) claims about the natural world, as is often the case with creationism. A 
few-thousand-years-old-earth, a worldwide flood, or the necessity of an intelligent designer to produce 
bacterial flagella are, to paraphrase philosopher Jeremy Bentham, nonsense on stilts, nonsense that needs 
to be vigorously fought against by scientists and science educators. However, that still leaves plenty of 
room  for  a  peaceful  coexistence  of  science  and  religion  when  one  recognizes,  and  respects,  the 
distinction between methodological and philosophical naturalism. 
Science and society: the difference between “is” and “ought”. Many controversies between scientists 
and ideological fundamentalists (the word here indicating a broader context than just the religious one) 
are rooted in a second common misconception, one that philosophers often refer to as the “naturalistic 
fallacy.” David Hume
10, the 18
th century Scottish philosopher, first described the fallacy (though he 
didn't name it) in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume wrote about his puzzlement when 
encountering philosophical essays that began by considering matters of fact (what is) and somehow 
shifted  to  discussions  of  matters  of  value  (what  ought  to  be),  without  making  the  link  explicit,  or 
justifying it in any reasonable way. 
The idea is of course not that there is no connection between facts and values, but rather to make clear 
that such connection is anything but automatic, and it needs to be justified. So, for example, a scientist 3  Fundamentalism and science 
 
 
can be intellectually interested in pursuing fundamental research on the properties of stem cells (or of 
genetically engineered crops, or whatever), without this implying that the very act of carrying out such 
research necessarily implies certain ethical positions (i.e., the scientist in question cannot automatically 
be labeled a “nazi,” or an anti-environmentalist in the pockets of the bioengineering industry). By the 
same token, however, the scientist should be aware that it is society at large that decides what level of 
public funding goes to science, and most especially what sort of applications of scientific findings are 
acceptable  from  an  ethical  standpoint.  In  other  words,  the  scientist  doesn't  get  to  cry  “anti-
intellectualism” every time there is a legitimate public discussion about ethical issues in science. 
A better way to conceive of the science and society relationship, instead, is that the two are connected, 
but in multiple and negotiable fashions. On the one hand, science should be free as much as possible to 
pursue fundamental research in all areas of human knowledge, both for its own sake and because of the 
potentially positive consequences on society. On the other hand, scientists cannot be the sole arbiters of 
ethical decisions about what sort of applied science is acceptable by society at large, although of course 
scientists do play a special dual role of both informed experts and participating citizens in any such 
decision. As Hume would put it, there may be a connection between what is and what ought to be, but it 
has to be reasonably fleshed out in every specific case. 
Again, the challenge often concerns how to explain this in a way that is clear and understandable 
without having to mandate that everybody take a course in philosophy (though the latter isn't necessarily 
a bad idea). A good starting point is offered by obvious cases where the is/ought connection is clearly 
rejected  by  any  sane  person,  scientist  or  not.  To  use  one  of  many  available  examples,  science  has 
demonstrated that it is “natural” (it's a matter of fact) for the males of some species of mammals (e.g., 
lions) to kill the offspring that a female had with another male, before taking her as a mate. This most 
certainly doesn't imply that the study of behavioral ecology somehow leads to the justification of such 
actions for conscious beings such as humans (i.e., the “ought” simply doesn't follow). Therefore, we 
should fund research in potentially controversial areas because we need all the information we can get in 
order to make intelligent decisions, but it ought to be clear to both scientists and the public at large that 
ethical decisions are simply too important to be simplistically derived by the observation of what is 
“natural.” 
What  to  do?  Toward  a  general  program  of  science-philosophy  literacy.  Scientists  and  science 
educators,  when  faced  with  the  question  of  irrational  attacks  against  science,  usually  respond  by 
clamoring for more science education. There certainly is a need for more, and better, science education. 
However, there is also increasing evidence that more science literacy is not only insufficient, but may 
have little or no effect if it is not accompanied by efforts at teaching critical thinking and the nature of 
science
11,12. The problem is that too much pre-college (and even introductory-level college) science 
education focuses on factual knowledge at the expense of broad conceptual issues, especially in the 
biological  sciences.  Obviously,  we  do  want  our  students  (and  the  citizenry  at  large)  to  get  some 
fundamental  scientific  facts  straight;  but,  more  importantly,  we  are  in  desperate  need  of  people 
understanding the scope, power, and especially limits of the scientific enterprise. Such understanding is 
crucial  for  the  functioning  of  modern  democracies,  where  science  plays  an  ever-increasing  role  in 
everybody's life. 
The  fact  is,  the  teaching  of  critical  thinking  and  understanding  of  the  nature  of  science  are  more 
properly – or at least equally – seen as the domains of philosophy, and require engaging philosophers as 
well as scientists in the response to fundamentalism. Moreover, as I have tried to argue above, much of 
the roots of anti-intellectualism and anti-science thinking are to be found in issues of ethics and religion, 
again the proper domain of philosophy, and areas in which scientists usually find themselves unprepared 
and uneasy. We need not turn scientists into philosophers, nor can we pretend that the general public be 
knowledgeable of the depth of scientific and philosophical inquiry. What we can and need to do – 
urgently – is to promote wide, inter-disciplinary efforts at educating scientists, science educators, and the 
public at large about the best ways to see the science-society-religion triangle. Nothing short of the 
future of modern civilization depends on it. 
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